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Cloud computing technologies have reached a high level of development, yet a number of obstacles 
still exist that must be overcome before widespread commercial adoption can become a reality. In a 
cloud environment, end-users requesting services and cloud providers negotiate Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) that provide explicit statements of all expectations and obligations of the 
participants. If cloud computing is to experience widespread commercial adoption, then incorporating 
risk assessment techniques is essential, during SLA negotiation and service operation. This paper 
focuses on the legal issues surrounding risk assessment in Cloud Computing. Specifically, it analyses 
risk regarding data protection and security, and presents the requirements of an inherent risk 
inventory. The usefulness of such risk inventory is described in the context of the OPTIMIS project. 
Keywords: cloud computing; risk assessment; risk inventory; data protection; data security 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
After decades in which companies used to host their entire IT infrastructures in-house, a major shift is 
occurring where these infrastructures are outsourced to external operators such as data centers and 
Clouds (Carr 2008). Clouds by definition are a large pool of easily usable and accessible virtualized 
resources (such as hardware, development platforms, storage and services). These resources can be 
dynamically re-configured to adjust to a variable load, allowing for optimum resource utilization. A 
pay-per-use model in which the Cloud providers offer guarantees, typically exploit this pool of 
resources. 
A successful Cloud infrastructure is underpinned by delivering the required Quality of Service (QoS) 
OHYHOVWRLWVXVHUV$GGLWLRQDOO\VXFFHVVUHOLHVRQDXVHU¶VDELOLW\WRH[SUHVV4R6UHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHLU
applications prior to their deployment and operation on a Cloud infrastructure. The notion of QoS 
usually focuses on a number of factors, which consist of performance, trust, security, energy 
consumption and cost, all of which stand as challenging issues in Cloud infrastructures. 
However, significant developments in the areas of risk assessment are necessary before widespread 
commercial adoption can become a reality. Specifically, risk assessment mechanisms need to be 
incorporated into cloud infrastructures, in order to move beyond the best-effort approach to service 
provision that current cloud infrastructures follow. 
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of risk management as applied to cloud computing: legal 
issues, which are viewed as high-level concerns that underpin the non-functional properties of cloud 
infrastructures. Specifically, it analyses risk regarding data protection and security, for example risk 
of loss of data and ownership rights. 
The importance of risk management in Cloud computing is a consequence of the need to support 
various parties involved in making informed decisions regarding contractual agreements (Djemame et 
al. 2011). Consider a cloud provider that wishes to offer use of its resources as a pay-per-use service. 
Interactions between a cloud provider and an end-user (a service consumer) can then be governed 
through a Service Level Agreement (SLA), contractually defining the cloud provider's obligations, the 
price the end-user must pay and the penalty the cloud provider needs to pay in the event that it fails to 
fulfil its obligations. The use of SLAs to govern such interactions in Cloud computing is gaining 
momentum (Ferrer 2011). However, such agreements may represent a legal risk to the parties 
involved. An SLA violation could be caused by various events such as disclosure and alteration of 
end-user data. Consequently a provider may be unwilling to implement such an approach without 
effective risk assessment. Similarly, end-users benefit from an evaluation of the legal implications of 
agreeing to particular SLA offer. Therefore, the main contributions of the paper are: 1) an analysis of 
risk from the legal perspective in clouds, focusing on data protection and security, and 2) the 
requirements of an inherent risk inventory. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the problem of assessing legal risk 
in Clouds and introduces the risk assessment methodology. Section 3 analyzes data protection policies 
and the minimum security standards, and provides legal guidance on the appropriate measures to be 
implemented. Furthermore, despite all the economic benefits Cloud Computing can offer, there are 
many other risks enterprises/end-users should be aware of before entering into a contractual 
agreement with a provider. We analyze these risks and scrutinize the ways of mitigating such risks. 
Section 4 describes how legal requirements can be taken into account when creating a risk inventory 
framework for the Cloud. Section 5 presents the implementation details of such risk inventory, 
showcasing the application of the methodology against two use cases (Ferrer et al. 2010): federated and 
multi-Clouds. Section 6 addresses related work, while conclusions and future work are summarised in 
Section 7. 
2. Motivation and Background 
By its distributed nature, Cloud Computing often blurs the location of and the security measures 
associated with data. This situation when it occurs can collide with legal data protection requirements. 
End-users must, however, be familiar with the regulations that govern their business in order to assess 
the risk levels of putting their data, network services and processing into the cloud. There are several 
risks, especially with regard to data protection and security (ENISA 2009). Examples include 
destruction of data, loss of data and ownership rights, disclosure and alteration of data, unauthorised 
access by third parties or authorities of countries outside EU/EEA and uncertain regulatory 
compliance. From the legal perspective, the realities cloud computing end-users must reconcile: 
i. How their data, applications and infrastructures are stored and managed by others in remote 
locations. 
ii. If their proprietary data can be stored with the data of other tenants (some of whom may even 
be competitors) on shared infrastructure (at least in the public cloud). 
iii. Data provisioned dynamically can bring loss of control to personal data processed in Cloud. 
iv. Cloud Computing providers often subcontract and outsource the provisioning of their services 
to unknown third parties in unknown locations. 
v. Data and databases can be easily reproduced on Virtual Machines (VMs) running in Cloud. 
vi. Cloud Computing has the technology which can potentially generate new information derived 
from the data made available from users (either individuals or companies). 
5LVN LV GHILQHG DV ³+D]DUG GDQJHU H[SRVXUH WR PLVFKDQFH RU SHULO´ (RMS 2009). In the present 
context, risk corresponds to hazardous events that have a negative impact on SLA fulfilment. In a 
cloud environment providers aim to assess and manage the risk associated with offering an SLA to an 
end-user. Hence the hazardous events from this perspective are any events which potentially 
DGYHUVHO\DIIHFWWKHSURYLGHU¶VDELOLW\WRHQVXUHWKDWWKH6/$LVIXOfilled. The risk associated with such 
events can be characterised using two key parameters: the probability of occurrence and the impact of 
occurrence. Consider the example of unauthorised access to end-users personal data. In order to 
evaluate the risk of such event, the provider must take into account the possible causes of such an 
event and their likelihood of occurring. For example, unauthorised access to personal data could be 
caused by hacking, malware, malicious activities or even human error. Each of these causes must be 
accounted in order to enable an assessment of risk. All such events and their impact need to be 
considered in order to compute an overall probability of SLA violation. Regarding the impact of an 
SLA failure on an end-user, this is dependent on the application domain and requires a legal 
framework for a detailed analysis. 
Figure 1 describes the risk assessment steps. Note that risk assessment takes place at: 1) the service 
deployment stage for initial placement of services on cloud providers, possibly taking the legal factor 
as a criterion for cloud providers¶ selection, and 2) the service operation, where cloud resources and 
data are managed by the cloud provider to fulfil the Service Level Objectives (SLO), including the 
legal ones. During deployment and operation stages, risk needs to be constantly monitored in order to 
prevent any additional costs to be incurred to the end-users and cloud providers. 
 
Figure 1. Risk assessment lifecycle during service deployment and operation. 
In this paper, we firstly analyse data retention policies and the minimum security standards. Secondly, 
we describe the steps towards the design of a legal risk inventory and its implementation in Clouds. 
3. Legal Risks 
Legal risk in the IT industry continues to be an active area of research (Burnett, R. 2005, Rejas-
Muslera et al. 2007) and covers many aspects of the law, including topics such as copy protection, 
privacy and censorship. However our core interest lies in the risks associated with managing data, 
specifically: 
x Data protection and data security. A key inhibitor of the Cloud, where trust and control of 
the data is critical to building confidence. 
x Intellectual property rights. Includes the question ³Who owns the data in WKH &ORXG"´. 
Cloud Computing creates new data using various tools (data mining etc.). The concept of 
ownership implies the owner can control how the data will be regulated and issues of 
jurisdiction apply. 
In the following subsections, we discuss these legal aspects in the context of Cloud Computing. We 
group them according to two different perspectives, the end-user and the cloud provider. 
 
Figure 2. Legal issues and service lifecycle stages. 
Legal issues are present during all stages of the service lifecycle (Figure 2). In the initial contractual 
agreement which the end-user makes with a Cloud Provider, the end-user can specify legal clauses, 
which will satisfy certain service requirements on how data is to be protected. This is a legally 
binding contract, which must be fulfilled by the Cloud Provider. The Cloud Provider must ensure all 
clauses will be adhered to before deploying the service. Therefore constant monitoring of legal risks 
will be required during the operation phase. 
(a) End user Perspective 
Art. 17 (1) of the Data Protection Directive (DPD 1995) stipulates that the controller, i.e. the end user, 
must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against 
³GHVWUuction, [...], loss, alteration, [...]  disclosure or access, [ ...]  and against all other unlawful forms 
RISURFHVVLQJ´. 
Destruction of data. Personal data must be protected against accidental or unlawful destruction to 
ensure integrity and availability as well as business continuity. Destruction of personal data represents 
the complete removal or serious corruption of physical data (i.e. on the hard disk or in main memory) 
in the way that their recovery is impossible. 
The provision aims to ensure the physical and logical integrity and availability (ensuring business 
continuity) of the data processed. Cloud providers in general such as Amazon make use of VMs 
which process the data on physical hardware in data centers. On the one hand, compared to physical 
servers, data inside VMs are more volatile than data in traditional IT environments. If VMs crash or 
are shut down, the data are usually lost. Furthermore, if VM images or instances are stored on a 
physical server directly attached to the server itself, all hosted VMs totally depend on the physical 
machine they are running on. In the worst case, all data processed in a VM running on the server 
could be destroyed when the physical machine crashes or is destroyed, regardless whether caused by 
disasters or malevolent acts by unauthorised persons. This is an important issue in cloud computing, 
as more business-critical workloads are deployed in VMs. A catastrophic failure of a single physical 
server might therefore result in an interruption of a large number of services (VMWare 2009). 
Because cloud offerings are providing their services by using VMs, the data may be put at risk 
because of the fact that VMs containing personal data can easily be erased. Furthermore, there is the 
danger of physical machines being a Single Point of Failure for hosted VMs. Where the physical 
machine is destroyed, all VMs running on this machine will be affected. On the other hand, the 
relatively simple and inexpensive replication of VMs in multiple locations increases redundancy and 
independence from failure. 
Loss. The Data Protection Directive (DPD 1995) aims to protect the logical and physical availability 
of personal data by requiring the EU Member States to implement security measures against 
unplanned events (natural disasters, hardware failures). This element protects the physical and logical 
availability of the data. It emphasises the obligation to implement safeguards to prevent data from 
being unavailable due to unplanned events such as power interruption, natural disasters or 
spontaneous hardware failures. Keeping data in backup, the provision aims to keep data as available 
as possible since recovery measures might be costly and time consuming. However, as already 
mentioned, cloud computing benefits from increased redundancy and independence from failure as it 
stores data dynamically in different locations (ENISA 2009). Also, stored VMs will be available in 
much shorter time than physical servers. By taking measures against destruction of personal data, the 
requirement to prevent data loss should be fulfilled at the same time. One possible technical measure 
could be to implement Data Loss (Leak) Prevention (DLP) concepts in Clouds. 
Alteration. Another security measure to be taken is to protect personal data against alteration. The 
implementation of such safeguards aim to guarantee integrity of the data processed. To protect data 
against alteration, an IT system has to ensure that data may not be modified undetectably or adapted 
by unauthorised persons. This requires functions for input control in order to retrace who accessed 
which data, the time and purpose of access (Schultze-Melling 2010). The input control aims mainly to 
identify and retrace errors in the data processing, but it is also a tool to monitor unauthorised access 
and the integrity of the data processed in the IT system. 
Alteration means any modification applied to existing data which results in a difference compared to 
the time before the modification came into effect. Our analysis has shown that national data security 
obligations require controllers or processors to log whether data has been entered into the system, 
with date and time and by whom this has been done. This is of relevance for audits, i.e. for 
certification, but also with regard to possible security incidents or unlawful input or modification of 
personal data into the information processing system. The obligation to create logs will mainly affect 
the application (SaaS) layer. Only applications processing personal data will have to implement 
logging capabilities. The minimum content of a log file could look like: 
 [date (dd-mm-yyyy)] [time (hh:min:sec)] [person accessing the data (user name)] 
[identification of cloud customer (i.e.by customer no.)] [application accessed 
(application name or module)] [nature of data (i.e. special categories of personal data)] 
[security level (basic, medium, high)] [action taken (input, adaption removal)]  
The information given above should provide a sufficient overview to trace to what extent data have 
been altered. 
Concerning the retention period of audit logs, a general assessment is out of question. Instead, it 
depends on the nature and quantity of data concerned. Where special categories of data (Art. 8 Data 
Protection Directive) and/or large sets of personal data are concerned, the log file should be stored for 
a longer period even after the final removal of the original data, while log file information about non-
sensitive and/or small sets of personal data may be deleted earlier. Log files should be kept separately 
subject to the same security measures as the original data. Their content should be structured in a way 
that it is possible to segment it in order to make it available to customers. 
Disclosure. A very important data security requirement is that data have to be protected against 
unauthorised disclosure. Disclosure is the act of making something known that was previously secret 
or private. This element is one of the cornerstones of the data security framework. In fact, the data 
subject is only in the position to preserve the right to the protection of personal data, in case both 
controller and processors (the end user and cloud provider respectively), do not disclose the data to 
third parties. Thus, this element of the provision strives to preserve the confidentiality of data in a 
technical way. Especially in cloud computing environments, the aspect of confidentiality is of utmost 
importance. There are several reasons to this: Firstly, cloud computing supports multi-tenancy 
(ENISA 2009). Different service consumers or customers might be working on the same physical 
machine, only separated by a software abstraction layer. Therefore, personal data processed in a VM 
must strictly be separated from the data inside another VM so that the data cannot be disclosed to 
another tenant working on the same physical machine. For that reason, Clouds can ensure that at all 
times, data inside a VM is kept separately from other VMs that are not assigned to the same client. 
Secondly, data can be frequently distributed within the Clouds using a VM management component. 
Such a component would be responsible for efficient management of VMs running in a cloud 
infrastructure. The task of the component is to optimise how the VMs are placed on the physical 
UHVRXUFHVVRWKDWWKHSURYLGHU¶VLQWHUQDOJRDOVDUHPD[LPLVHG'LVWULEXWLQJWKHZRUNORDGLVLQKHUHQW in 
all matured cloud architectures, such as the Amazon Web Services with Elastic Load Balancing1. Data 
are dynamically allocated according to a large number of different factors. This leads to continuous 
data streams between different locations (data centres) of different providers, in order to find the 
optimal location for maximum performance and to keep the agreed service levels. Consequently, the 
risk that unauthorised persons in clouds are intercepting data, is higher than in traditional 
infrastructure as more data is in transit (ENISA 2009). The legislator has explicitly addressed this risk 
in Art. 17 Data Protection Directive (DPD 1995), where he states that data need to be protected 
against unauthorised disclosure 'in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data 
over a network'. This provision is therefore of high relevance, as cloud computing involves the 
transmission of large amounts of data 'in the cloud', which is basically a network of data centres 
sharing and distributing resources and should strive to guarantee safe and uninterrupted data transfer. 
Access. Another protective measure is to prevent unauthorised access to personal data. This element 
refers to the requirement of restricted permission to access data and process them. Its aim is therefore 
to implement measures for access control and guarantee the confidentiality of the data. Access 
control can be defined as a procedure used to determine if an entity should be granted access to 
resources, facilities, services, or information based on pre-established rules and specific rights or 
authority associated with the requesting party (ITUN 2010). Access control is very important, since 
only the data controller and/or the processors should be authorised to access the data. In addition, 
within the organisation of a cloud provider acting as a controller or processor, access rights should be 
carefully assigned to particular persons only. Finally, on the Software as a Service (SaaS) level, cloud 
services/applications should provide service consumers with the ability to assign access rights and 
restrictions for their own organisation, in order to avoid unauthorised access to personal data. 
In view of cloud computing, Identity and Access Management (IdAM) are important keywords here. 
Identity management can be defined as a set of functions and capabilities used for the assurance of 
identity information, assurance of the identity of an entity and supporting business and security 
applications. 
                                                          
1
 http://aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/?preview=true 
Transfer of data. There is a risk that personal data may be transferred and stored outside the EU or 
EEA countries. Respectively, the European Commission has decided that several countries ensure an 
adequate level of protection (e.g. Switzerland and the US, provided the importer is registered under 
³6DIH+DUERXU´WRZKLFKGDWDPD\EHWUDQVIHUUHGZLWKRXWVSHFLILFDGGLWLRQDO$Q\RWKHUWUDQVIHURI
personal data in the cloud to third countries is generally prohibited if there are no further legal 
safeguards. Data retention post termination of the SLA is another risk for customers. According to 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD 1995), the data may only be processed for adequate and 
relevant purposes. Upon termination of the SLA, the purpose ceases to exist; hence the data must be 
erased. There may also be cases where a Cloud provider terminates the SLA without notice to the 
end-user, resulting in a risk of the end-user losing access to all data. 
(b) Cloud Provider Perspective 
Ownership of data. Data ownership refers to both the possession of and responsibility for information 
which implies control over that information. Such control involves the capability to access, create, 
modify, package, derive from, sell or remove data as well as the right to assign these rights. 
Data has an intrinsic as well as an added value. This is usually something produced in the process of 
making something else. 'At the core, the degree of ownership (and by corollary, the degree of 
responsibility) is driven by the value that each interested party derives from the use of that 
information' (Data Management 2004). 
In an environment where there is shared control of data (such as cloud computing), there should be a 
complete understanding of the different matters related to data ownership in order to know who is 
entitled to claim such data. Accordingly, Gartner submitted a list of rights concerning rights and 
responsibilities with regard to cloud computing, expressly mentioning the right to retain ownership, 
the right for use and control of one's own data (Gartner Newsroom 2010). 
Data ownership does not have any practical value if one is not able to access his own data. For 
instance, if an end-user wants to migrate data away from the cloud computing provider it is important 
WRHQVXUHWKHFRQWUDFWDOORZVIRUDFFHVVWR³EDFk-HQGGDWD´$VXVXDOO\VXEVFULELQJWRDFORXGVHUYLFH
allows you to get access to the functionality of the application that you use, it is important to ensure 
customers can still access the data, provided such access is removed. Agreements between end-users 
and providers should offer export data capabilities, either directly or via the provider, even after the 
termination of the contract (Longbottom 2010). 
Therefore, loss of ownership rights will not only reduce or even compromise shareholders value, but 
PD\SXWDWULVNWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRPLJUDWHWRDQRWKHUSURYLGHU7KHRSSRUWXQLW\DQGDELOLW\WR
VZLWFKFORXGSURYLGHUVLVUHOHYDQWIRUWKHFRPSHWLWLRQRIHQWHUSULVHVLQWKHPDUNHW$YRLGLQJ³ORFNLQ´
and enabling switching between providers will encourage better service levels at lower costs thus 
fostering competition in the market (Kallenbach 2009). 
We conclude that it is of utmost importance to make sure the end-XVHUV³RZQ WKHLUGDWD´ WKDW WKH\
make available to the Cloud provider and that these ownership rights are mentioned and clarified in 
any formal agreement such as a SLA. 
Other unlawful forms of processing. Data must be protected against all other unlawful forms of 
processing. This vague legal term seems to be understood as a very broad concept. However, it is not 
easy to determine specific security measures in order to be compliant with this stipulation. In our 
view, the provision aims to ensure that data processing systems are designed in such a way that they 
ensure that data processing operations meet the obligations under the law. In short, this element tries 
to establish compliance with the provisions of the Data Protection Directive (DPD 1995) as a data 
security obligation. This refers to so-called "privacy enhancing technologies" (PET) which are 
specifically designed for protecting privacy (Terstegge 2006). PET stands for a coherent system of 
ICT measures that protects privacy by eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing 
unnecessary and/or undesired processing of personal data, all without losing the functionality of the 
information system.. For instance, one measure could be the automatic anonymisation of data after a 
certain lapse of time or encryption tools. 
"appropriate [...] measures". The data controller is only obliged to implement appropriate measures. 
The objective of this element is to eliminate or minimise the impact that different security related 
threats and vulnerabilities might have on an organisation's data processing (ENISA 2006). The 
Directive is not clear with regard to the level of security to be implemented by cloud providers. 
Security measures must be appropriate with regard to the anticipated risks inherent in the data 
processing, as well as with regard to the nature of data and the costs of their implementation 
(Terstegge 2006). Sensitive data as mentioned in Art. 8 (1) Data Protection Directive (DPD 1995) 
may require even more sophisticated security measures, while other data may require less strict 
measures. As the applications of security frameworks within cloud structures have a significant 
impact on performance, data management and costs, we recommended cloud providers to provide 
measures allowing service consumers to separate personal data from other data. This way, data not 
falling under the Data Protection Directive's scope can be processed more efficiently without the 
boundaries marked by data protection laws. 
Assessing appropriate security measures for cloud computing is not an easy task. In general, we have 
already highlighted that one of the specific cloud computing risks involves massive transfer of data. 
ENISA UDWHVWKHULVNRIGDWDEHLQJLQWHUFHSWHGLQWUDQVLWDV³KLJK´ (ENISA 2009). The ongoing debate 
about data protection and data security in clouds shows that there are major concerns and objections 
to cloud computing. Out of these considerations, we conclude that the overall risk of using cloud 
computing is higher than compared to using traditional IT. Consequently, to cope with these increased 
risks, the appropriate measures with regard to cloud computing require higher security efforts. 
However, appropriate security measures always have to be adjusted to the isolated case. While some 
cloud services host customer information of very low sensitivity, others represent mission critical 
business functions (CSA 2010). Where cloud computing involves the use of special categories of data 
(particularly sensitive data) according to Art. 8 Data Protection Directive (i.e. health data), they must 
be even more strictly secured. However, even this does not mean that every theoretically conceivable 
risk requires technical and organisational measures. Security measures protecting data in the cloud 
against these particular risks or threats should in any case be considered thoroughly (CSA 2010). 
4. Towards a Risk Inventory 
(a) Design 
When dealing with legal risks, one has to consider the actors involved when creating the risk 
inventory as introduced earlier: the end-users and the cloud providers. These actors can acquire 
different roles in the area of data protection law ± either data controller or processor. Since only the 
controller is legally responsible for the processing, as a matter of course the risk is higher than that 
connected with being a processor and processing data only on behalf of the controller. This has to be 
taken into account when creating the risk inventory, which will be populated with the following: 
- Assets: what to protect, e.g. data and their characteristics. Risk events will be assessed in 
terms of these. 
- Incidents/Risk Scenarios: to describe any event, condition or their combination that has the 
potential to reduce the capacity or availability of an asset. These are composed of 
vulnerabilities and threats. Adaptive capacity on the other hand is the description of the 
mitigating strategies in place for the specific asset. 
- Impact/Consequences: of a risk incident are defined using as degraded performance, loss, 
destruction, alteration, disclosure of data, service unavailability, etc. 
Various research areas have developed risk inventories for determining how certain risks can be 
managed and evaluated to be brought up to an acceptable level (ENISA 2012). Most of the steps 
towards creating the risk inventory vary across the different disciplines and context they are going to 
be used in. In terms of Cloud Computing, a set of processes are identified to create and manage a risk 
inventory for the implementation of the framework: 
1. Determine which use case scenario to focus on: private cloud, federated could, multi-Cloud. 
2. Determine the areas of interaction in the Cloud. Interaction takes place at various levels such as 
end-user/cloud provider or within the cloud provider between the service deployment and operation 
phases. During each of these levels an SLA is agreed between parties and its fulfilment monitored. 
3. Identify the assets involved, which have to be protected from external and internal dangers, as well 
as the vulnerabilities and threats these assets may have during operation. 
4. Identify the risk triggering factors for these assets. 
5. Identify the relationships between assets and various factors or events which may lead to risk 
mitigation. These relationships can be as follows: 
(i) Relationship between assets and vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities describe the inherent 
weakness of an asset and their impacts. Assets (A) and Vulnerabilities (V) have an 
interrelationship where each asset can have a number of vulnerabilities, and each vulnerability 
can pertain to more than one asset. ܣ ൌ ௜ܸ ǡ ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉  ܸ ൌ ܣ௝ ǡ ݂݋ݎ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊  ܸ ՞ ܣ 
(ii) Relationship between vulnerabilities, threat and risk: Threats (T) represent the other side 
of risk which depend on external factors which are independent of the asset. As vulnerabilities 
reflect the possibility of a risk, these can be related to the threatening factors being present. 
This leads to a risk (R). ܴ ൌ ௜ܸ ൈ ௞ܶǡ݂݋ݎ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݊ܽ݊݀݇ ൌ  ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݋  
(iii) Relationship between risk and events: Each risk can propagate a number of events (E) to 
take place which can in turn lead to further risks. Each risk consists of a risk category (RC) 
and risk level (RL). A risk level comprises of the impact of the risk and its likelihood. The 
impact is defined as the evaluation according to the indicators selected to describe the asset. 
The impact and likelihood can be categorised as ± very low, low, medium, high or very high. 
These determine the level of the risk by multiplying the risk impact and risk likelihood. ܴ ൌ  ܧ௟ ǡ݂݋ݎ݈ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݌  ܧ ൌ ܴ௤ ǡ݂݋ݎݍ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݎ  ׊ܴ ൌ ܴܥ ת ܴܮ ܴܮ ൌ ܫ ൈ ܮ (iv) Relationship between risks and their mitigations: Mitigation strategies depend on the 
asset, the event and any additional environmental factors (X). ܯ ൌ ܣ ൈ ܧ ൈ ܺ 
Different Cloud scenarios can allow different assets to be at threat, depending on the service running 
on the providers. These threats can be of various kinds generated by the different interacting 
components such as the data, SLA or security management. Following is a list of legal threat 
scenarios associated with the different managers which cause them. 
- Threat: Data transfer to other countries, Causing agent: Data manager 
 This threat can be monitored using all the current processing operations in the data manager, 
particularly with regard to the location of processing. It can be insured that there is no externalization 
of resources to data centers in countries without an adequate level of protection only when additional 
legal safeguards are in place (e.g. standard contractual clauses). 
- Threat: SLA violations, Causing agent: SLA manager 
 This threat can be monitored by using all the current processing operations on the data. All 
processing should follow instructions from controllers and any further subcontracting with other 
processors must require consent with the cloud end-user. 
- Threat: Data protection and security issues, Causing agent: Security framework manager 
 The data manager must ensure that personal data is protected against accidental or unlawful 
destruction. It can create logs concerning any alteration made to the data. Personal data must be 
protected against unauthorised disclosure in order to guarantee the safe and uninterrupted transfer of 
data by using encryption. This can be protected by implementing an Identity and Access 
Management. The Cloud security framework should be based on a recognized Information Security 
Related Standard such as ISO/IEC 27001:2005. 
Table 1 describes the risk inventory design presenting the asset names and values they possess which 
highlights how important the asset is. These values can be set by the experts who are involved in 
managing the cloud. The risk inventory documents all the risks to the assets and their related 
vulnerabilities and threats. Starting with the assets, vulnerabilities and threats with their probabilities 
can be documented in advance. Vulnerability Exploitability (VE) represents to what degree the 
vulnerability can be exploited and its affect on the impact level of the risk, i.e. IL=Level(AVൈVE). 
Vulnerability Severity (VS) represents the degree that the vulnerability exhibits and contributes to the 
final risk. 
Later, Section 5 discusses the implementation details on how the risk inventory will work as part of 
the cloud infrastructure. The risk inventory works as an automated process that can be easily used by 
the providers to check the risk levels of the associated architectures and service and not applicable at 
the end-user level. 
Table 1. Examples of Cloud Provider Risk Inventory Entries. 
Attribute 
Name 
Value 
Range 
Value 
Calculation Example1 Example2 
Asset Name N/A By Expert Opinion 
Application Generated 
Data Personal Data 
Asset Value(AV) 0.00-1.00 By Expert Opinion 0.9 0.9 
Main Vulnerability N/A By Expert Opinion 
Subcontracting in 
Federated Clouds 
Hidden 
Dependency of 
Cross Multiple 
Cloud 
Applications 
Vulnerability 
Exploitability(VE) 0.00-1.00 By Expert Opinion 0.8 0.6 
Vulnerability 
Severity(VS) 0.00-1.00 By Expert Opinion 0.9 0.9 
Main Threat Event 
to the Main 
Vulnerability N/A By Expert Opinion 
Loss of Data 
Ownership 
Loss of 
Governance 
Impact Level of 
Risk(IL) [1-5] IL=Level(AV*VE) 0.9*0.8 (i.e., Level 5) 
0.9*0.6 (i.e., Level 
4) 
Risk Category 
[General, 
Technical, 
Policy, 
Legal] By Expert Opinion Legal Legal 
 
The risk inventory will work in conjunction with a rule-based risk model to assess some of the risks 
during processing. The rule-based risk model will allow certain threats to be detected and trigger 
which events in the risk inventory. For example, the threat of data moving to a not trusted zone can be 
detected by constantly monitoring the log files which document every time the data is processed or 
moved. While traversing the files, the rule-based model will repeatedly fire the following rule: 
 If (location == 'unknown_ip_address') then 
   Check risk inventory where "Asset==Data", Output "Impact Level of Risk" 
This level of risk can be communicated to the controllers, which can then make a decision on which 
risk mitigation strategy should be employed, whether to accept the risk, if the impact level is down, or 
shut down certain processes, if the impact level is too high. 
(b) Usage in Scenarios 
Clouds can process services in different ways or scenarios such as the private cloud, cloud bursting or 
multi-Clouds and federation of Clouds. From the legal risk perspective, this becomes a particular 
issue in scenarios such as the multi-Cloud and the federation of Clouds. The main stakeholders in both 
scenarios are both the end-user and the cloud provider. Some legal threats in both scenarios are 
discussed next. The CORAS tool (Vraalsen et al. 2005), an open source risk modelling tool, is used to 
illustrate risk. 
 
 Figure 3. Modelling Legal Risk in a Multi-Cloud Scenario (Prevention: Check Monitoring Logs) 
In a multi-Cloud scenario the service is deployed to run on multiple providers. Using multiple 
providers gives access to additional resources at the service operation, and allows the choice of the 
most appropriate providers depending on the functional and non-functional requirements of the SLA. 
The legal risk described in Figure 3 depicts the threat of data being transferred to a provider in an 
unknown location. The asset in thus the data to be protected and the stakeholder affected by such 
threat is the cloud provider which had deployed the service. Therefore, this threat needs to be 
monitored by traversing the logs which record where the data is moved during the cloud lifecycle. 
 
Figure 4. Modelling Legal Risk in a Federated Cloud Scenario (Prevention: Monitor SLA Violations during 
Processing) 
In a federation of clouds, a service can be deployed into a set of providers working in collaboration to 
meet the service requirements. This use case differs from the multi-Cloud use case as the providers 
have previously entered into a mutual agreement between all members of the federation before 
coming into contact with the deployed service. The threat described in Figure 4, depicts what happens 
if one of the provider in the federation running the service is in an unknown location. This provider is 
called the 'IP' in the figure. In Clouds in most cases, the end-user can specify that the providers used 
should not be located in particular countries. In such a case, data deployed to that particular provider 
can lead to a violation in the SLA. Therefore, the asset here is the SLA and the stakeholder affected is 
the end-user. 
 
 
 
 
5. Implementation and Evaluation 
 
Figure 5. Risk inventory's role in the cloud architecture helping the identification of legal risks. 
The OPTIMIS (Optimized Infrastructure Services) project (Ferrer 2011) is an EC funded R&D project 
that aims to enable an open and dependable Cloud Service Ecosystem (CSE) that delivers IT services 
that are adaptable, reliable, auditable and sustainable both ecologically and economically. The 
OPTIMIS project is delivering an open specification and a software toolkit that supports the 
construction of the multiple coexisting architectures that make up the next generation CSE. The 
OPTIMIS Base Toolkit provides functionalities common to components that are used during cloud 
service deployment and operation phases. These include TREC (Trust, Risk, Eco-efficiency, and 
Cost) factors assessment tools, cloud infrastructure monitoring infrastructure, and capabilities for 
secure interconnection of multiple clouds as well as end-to-end security. The TREC factors are 
harmonized to support the optimisation decision-making by high level components such as the Virtual 
Machine Manager and the Data Manager. In OPTIMIS, two stakeholders are considered: the Service 
Provider (SP) responsible for the deployment of the service on behalf of the end-user, and the 
Infrastructure Provider (IP) responsible for running the service. 
As a knowledge base for risk assessment, the risk inventory designed in Section 4 is being integrated 
with a rule-based risk modelling component as part of the risk assessment software tool (Figure 5). 
The risk assessment tool is a self-contained independent functional module that is able to perform as a 
³SOXJ-LQ´ IRU RWKHU KLJK OHYHO Floud management and control tools, specifically for service 
optimization at deployment and operation stages. In the context of OPTIMIS, the risk assessment tool 
is implemented as two independent components: the Service Provider Risk Assessment Tool 
(SPRAT) and the Infrastructure Provider Risk Assessment Tool (IPRAT) for the service deployment 
and operation phases respectively. Regarding the service construction phase, the end-user of a Cloud 
service can specify the legal aspect related requirements in the SLA via the Cloud Programming IDE 
provided by the OPTIMIS toolkit. 
(a) Service Deployment 
Figure 6 depicts the various factors that can additionally input into the risk inventory for assessing 
certain events. This would take place particularly on the deployment phase where the risk assessment 
is based on the data which is communicated across about the profile of the provider in use. This can 
either be historical data based on the past or the current monitored events. To assess the profile of a 
provider, the figure depicts the seven criteria extracted from (Jansen & Grance. 2011) which can be 
used in conjunction with the DS-AHP (Dempster-Shafer Analytical Hierarchy Process) algorithm 
(Djemame et al. 2011) to help build a sorted list of the best to worst providers from the risk point of 
view. This list then helps to choose the most reliable provider to deploy the service on. 
 
Figure 6. Risk inventory takes inputs from basic standards to assess the providers. 
For the SPRAT, its high level functions (e.g. evaluate the reliability of a specific IP offer) are mainly 
exposed by its external interfaces defined in its sub-components. The risk inventory is designed as a 
knowledge base to consist of facts, scenarios and reasoning rules for risk assessments related 
decision-making activities. 
(b) Service Operation 
 
Figure 7. Risk inventory Use is SLA dependent during operation phase. 
During the operation phase, the risk inventory would take inputs from the monitoring environment as 
depicted in Figure 7. At this stage, the service is tied to the SLA previously agreed between the SP 
and the IP. The SLA thus needs to be constantly monitored to ensure it does not get violated during 
the time the service is in operation. 
For the IPRAT, its high level functions (e.g. evaluate the legal risk prior to data transfer) are mainly 
exposed by its external interfaces. The risk inventory is designed as a knowledge base to consist of 
facts, scenarios, and reasoning rules that are related to lower level hardware and software resources. 
The risk assessment tools will be evaluated in the OPTIMIS test bed thanks to the interactions with 
other OPTIMIS toolkit components under different use case scenarios as presented in the Section 4. 
The accuracy of the risk assessment can then be judged by effectiveness of optimisation conducted by 
the high level components that depend on the assessments by the risk and other TREC factor tools 
collectively. 
 
 
7. Related Work 
In this section some related work on Cloud/Grid computing middleware and legal risk/security 
assessments is reviewed. Although the research work presented in this paper so far focuses on the 
legal aspects of data ownership and protection in clouds, it is worth noting other related aspects such 
as the assessment of cloud end-user privacy protection and confidentiality under different legal 
systems (Movius et al. 2009). 
(Djemame et al. 2009) has considered specific aspects of SLAs and developed Grid architectural 
support for building risk aware brokering components. (Claessens J. 2008) aims to deliver a data-
centric information protection framework based on data-sharing agreements in open computing 
environments. The framework enables dynamic management policies based on agreements that ensure 
end-to end secure protection of data-centric information incorporating models and implementation of 
risk and context-aware policy refinement mechanisms. A formal goal oriented risk framework is 
proposed for modelling, assessing, and treating risk on the basis of the likelihood and severity of 
failures in critical systems. (Balducelli et al. 2008) aims to increase dependability, survivability and 
resilience of information-based infrastructures such as communication technologies and pervasive 
systems. The work proposes a middleware which facilitates secure IT-based communication between 
different infrastructures providers. By supporting recovery actions and increasing service stability in 
case of critical situations through scenario and risk analysis, this middleware substantially enhances 
the security of large complex mission critical infrastructures.  
Most of the above work focuses on either risks related to Grids or risks related to aspects of data 
security in general computing. They do not consider risk assessment in cloud computing or more 
specifically the legal risks associated with using cloud infrastructures. However, they do shed light on 
risk assessment from both end-user and server/provider perspectives and provide potential use cases 
for the work presented in this paper. 
In many cases, the concerns of privacy and confidentiality are related to the ownership of data 
generated and stored on a Cloud Provider. For example, when an application is deployed into the 
Cloud, it generates indirect real time data that can be used to build statistics on an applLFDWLRQ¶VXVHU
access behaviour patterns. The ownership of this data effects privacy and confidentiality from the 
point of view of the end-user. As investigated by (Gellman 2009), ³A uVHU¶V SULYDF\ DQG
confidentiality risks vary significantly with the terms of service and privacy policy established by the 
cloud provider. Those risks may be magnified when the cloud provider has reserved the right to 
FKDQJH LWV WHUPVDQGSROLFLHVDWZLOO´7KLVFRQFOXVLRQ LV LQ OLQHZLWKRXUYLVLRQRIFRQGXFWLQJ ULVN
assessment from the perspectives of both Cloud users and Cloud Providers. In addition, the report 
discusses outsourcing, which due to the elastic and ubiquitous nature of cloud service provision, is 
normal practice for a Cloud Provider to contract out part of its user data and usages onto another 
provider. Under this circumstance we identify the need for delegating related legal risk assessment. In 
the work by (Ruiter et al. 2011), uncertainties with respect to privacy regulations in Cloud Computing 
are investigated and discussed. It concludes that even when the Cloud Provider is compliant with the 
privacy regulations the end-user still needs to ensure they adhere to the legislation set in the 
regulations themselves. More awareness amongst cloud users may eventually lead to an increase in 
the number of compliant Cloud Providers; on the other hand, it also highlights the juridical impact on 
privacy within Cloud computing. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The use of SLAs to govern interactions in Cloud computing between end-users and cloud providers is 
gaining momentum. However, such agreements may represent a legal risk to the parties involved.  
End-users who wish to procure critical cloud computing services may need to challenge the cloud 
provider positions present in the SLA. In turn, cloud providers will need to appreciate end-XVHUV¶QHHG 
to obtain both technical and legal assurances. In such a scenario, only a fully negotiated SLA can 
provide both parties with a satisfactory allocation of risk. 
Cloud computing necessarily implies data transfer and, possibly, a trans-border data flow. From this 
perspective, the legal qualification of the subjects involved with the data flow and the definition of the 
consequent responsibilities and obligations is fundamental. Therefore, this paper has addressed an 
important issue in relation to risk assessment in cloud computing. It has presented an analysis of risk 
from the legal perspective, focusing on data protection and security, as well the requirements of an 
inherent risk inventory. 
The implementation of such risk inventory is currently under way (Ferrer 2011) as part of the 
OPTIMIS project use cases: Multi- and federated clouds. These use cases have various implications 
for OPTIMIS as the differing goal of each contribute to what vulnerabilities an asset may have and 
thus its associated legal risk factors.  
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